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Abstract    
 
Although individual games are normally used to model isolated interaction types, larger 
spaces of games can be helpful for modeling the processes by which such interactions 
change. We introduce a framework for modeling how individuals change the games they are 
placed in, a process we term “institutional evolution,” to contrast with “behavioral evolution,” 
which occurs within- rather than between-game. Starting at random locations in an abstract 
game space, agents trace trajectories through the space by repeatedly navigating to 
“neighboring” games, until they converge on “attractor” games that they prefer to all others. 
Agents choose between games on the basis of “institutional preferences” that define  
between-game comparisons in terms of game-level features such as fairness and efficiency. 
We then characterize the attractors of institutional evolutionary over three types of game 
theoretic agent: the absolute fitness maximizing agent of economic game theory (who is 
indifferent to inequality), the relative fitness maximizing agent of evolutionary game theory (who 
maximizes inequality), and the relative group fitness maximizing agent of multi-level/group 
selection theory (who minimizes inequality). Computing institutional change trajectories over 
the space of two-player ranked-outcome games, we find that the institutional evolutionary 
process leads to very different attractors depending on the agent. While "win-win" games 
account for 25% of games in the space we examine, this proportion is much different among 
attractor games, either 50%, 0%, or 100% depending on whether agents are economic, 
evolutionary, or group-level. The result for economic agents is especially interesting: although 
they are indifferent to the fairness of the games they choose between, their attractors over-
represent fairness by 100% relative to baseline, apparently because fairness happens to co-
occur with the self-serving features these agents do prefer. We thus present institutional 
evolution as a mechanism for encouraging the spontaneous emergence of cooperation among 
inherently selfish agents. We then investigate the sensitivity of these findings to the other two 
contexts, and to games of more than two players, and we discuss the implications for the 
emergence of conventions, social systems with large populations, and the mechanisms of 
major evolutionary transitions. This work provides a flexible, testable formalism for capturing 
institutional evolutionary process, and for modeling the interdependencies of behavioral and 
institutional evolutionary processes.  
` 
Introduction 
Evolutionary game theory has proven valuable for the analysis of cooperation in a wide 
variety of biological and social systems, and researchers in the area are increasingly 
characterizing the conditions necessary for fostering cooperation spontaneously. However, 
these results continue to treat the games agents play as fixed, disregarding the fact that agents 
in many game-like settings have incremental influence over the incentive structures they face, 
and that agents may adjust the games they play toward certain payoff structures. Across the 
animal world, formalisms allowing agents to change a game’s payoffs have provided 
parsimonious models of the intricacies of sexual selection (1), interactions with resource 
systems (2), and the emergence of diversity (3).  And in the human world specifically, 
incremental changes to game structures offer a rich model of institutional change at the human 
level, with findings on preferences for fair punishment (4), on fairness/efficiency tradeoffs (5, 6), 
and negotiation processes (7). Linking within- and between- game behavior and preferences 
allows us to study emergent complexity in settings ranging from governance institutions to 
behavioral ecology. 
Here we present a flexible formalism for studying the interactions of within-game "behavioral 
evolution" — the familiar purview of game theory — with between-game “institutional 
  
evolution.”  Treating normal-form two-by-two games as toy institutions, we represent 
institutional change dynamics in terms of trajectories over "neighboring" games, games that 
differ minimally in payoffs. By modeling institutional evolutionary dynamics explicitly, we 
provide a tractable formalism for generalizing beyond static models of institution formation to 
testing theories of institutional change.  This allows us to move beyond the simplifying 
assumption in institutional analysis, tacit in theories of human institutional development like 
Rawl's original position (8), that a planned institution is realized perfectly and remains stable, 
never deviating in practice from its design.  
Background 
In our framework, the selection pressures driving institutional evolution are players’ 
institutional preferences—the values and qualities agents look for in a social system. 
Institutional preferences fit within a broader academic interest in human preferences between 
social constructions such as games, culture, norms, and language (9–11). Institutional 
preferences have attracted specific interest with theories such as Binmore’s, that the 
processes of cultural evolution select for institutions with the features of stability, efficiency, 
and fairness, in that order (12). Illustrating the potential for applications to policy, researchers 
have elicited communities preferences for the features of local natural resource governance 
institutions (13, 14).  
Research on institutional preferences and behavior over game spaces has emerged 
independently in several disciplines, and efforts to explore larger sets of games are gaining 
recognition, both in theoretical and experimental work (15, 16).  However, theoretical interest in 
game spaces has put more focus on static comparisons between the games in a space than 
dynamics across them. Previous work is primarily concerned with behavioral rather than 
institutional dynamics, in that it leverages large game spaces to catalog the variety of within-
game dynamics (17–21), rather than defining preferences over games or trajectories through 
them.  
Among attempts to explore large game spaces, one space in particular, the Topology of 
Games, has attracted broad formal attempts to taxonomize or otherwise compare behavior 
across a range of games (22, 23) (see Fig 1a for a sample of the variety of games in the space, 
and Figs. 2a, S1 for 2D representations of the space ). The space was first organized as a 
taxonomy by Rapaport (24). Its simplicity and structure make it an ideal substrate for modeling 
the processes of institutional evolution (25) (Fig 1b). 
Institutional evolution 
We introduce a framework for modeling game change as a trajectory through a space of 
economic games. In our formalism, agents traverse a lattice of games linked by similarity. They 
do so in a hill climbing process that optimizes over desirable game features such as stability, 
efficiency, predictability, etc. To specify this framework, we define a space, distances over it, 
and the elements of dynamics through it. 
Institution space. In the most general terms, we understand institutional evolution as a 
process in which a set of agents experiences an institution, changes it incrementally in line with 
their preferences, experiences it again, and so on (Fig. 1b). The first challenge in making this 
picture concrete is to find a space of social systems that is rich enough to capture a range of 
human exchange patterns, but simple enough to remain tractable. 
We begin with the Topology of Games (22) a space of social systems defined in terms of the 
two-choice ordinal (ranked-outcome) normal-form games, an arrangement of the 144 unique 
ways that two agents can assign their own strict rankings over four outcomes (Figs 2a, S1).  
This space, including extension to n-person games in this paper, has several attractive 
properties. It is simple, composed of the most elementary class of economic game, and 
amenable to counting. It is also rich: games in the space represent a broad array of social 
  
situations (Figs. 1a, 2d). The two-player space includes many of the most famous economic 
games, such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken, as well as social situations that have 
traditionally attracted little academic interest, such as no-conflict and win-win games in which 
individual’s choices lead non-strategically to outcomes that benefit all (26). As mundane as 
these "non-game" games are, their value is clear in the fact that most of our daily social 
exchanges are similarly mundane. Overall, the space parsimoniously captures an impressive 
variety of interdependence patterns in human interactions (24, 27). 
A major source of appeal for the space is its amenability to formal combinatoric approaches. 
There are 144 games in this space. 3/4 have exactly 1 pure strategy Nash equilibrium, 1/8 have 
0, and 1/8 have two (Fib 2b). As population increases beyond 2, the number of games grows 
super exponentially, while the count of expected Nash equilibria per game grows more 
modestly, approaching a standard Poisson distribution, with a game's chances of having 0 or 1 
equilibria equal to e-1~37% and the remaining quarter have 2 or more (28, 29). Like the number 
of games, the number of neighbors per game also explodes, following 
    
where n is the number of players in a game of size   
     
This explosion in the number of neighbors per game implies an even larger explosion in the 
number of shortest paths between pairs of games, such that simple local strategies like hill 
climbing can reliably find global optima (30, 31). In a sense, the increasingly convoluted 
topology of this space, however intriguing, probably does not meaningfully constrain 
trajectories through it, especially as n increases.   
Distance. With the set of games in place, it is possible to introduce a simple conception of 
distance. We start by restricting our attention to incremental institutional change—trajectories 
occur over "neighboring" games. Translated to game space, two games are immediate 
neighbors if they differ only minimally in payoffs (Fig. 2c).  Specifically, two games are 
neighbors if the only difference between them are the locations of a 1 and a 2 ranking, a 2 and 
a 3, or a 3 and a 4: the Stag Hunt neighbors the Win-Win game because swapping the 
locations of a 1 payoff and a 2 payoffs will turn the former game into the latter (Fig. 1b shows 
one possible trajectory from the Prisoner's Dilemma to a Win-Win game). 
A dynamic over game space. Given a space and metric over it, we can begin to specify 
dynamics. Agents alternative playing the current game (on the basis of within-game rules) and 
choosing which neighboring game to evolve to (on the basis of between-game rules). A 
dynamic in this framework is thus specified in three parts: the definition of player behavior 
within a game, the definition of a players' "institutional preferences" for selecting between a 
game and its neighbors, and the rules for aggregating all agents' game preferences into a 
single choice. Repeated as stages, a trajectory is produced by repeatedly cycling through the 
steps of playing a game, eliciting preferences among neighboring games, and selecting a game 
from the preferences produced. A trajectory has terminated in an attractor game when no 
neighboring game is preferred to the current one.    
The self-interested dynamic. Given this framework, we define a dynamic based on rational, 
self-interested agents who change the games they play with an eye to institutionalizing their 
profits and position. This generalizes the absolute fitness maximizing agent of economic game 
theory.  Where such artificially selfish agents converge on prosocial outcomes, more realistic 
agents are at least as likely to do the same. 
  
Within-game, agents in this self-interested dynamic play rationally, selecting unique pure-
strategy Nash equilibria when they exist, and mixed-strategy equilibria otherwise, randomizing 
over equilibria when several of one type exist. 
Across games, a player's institutional preferences define their trajectory. Agents in the self-
interested dynamic prefer games that are stable, predictable, and efficient; they prefer a game 
with a Nash equilibrium that is unique (stable), that is in pure strategies (predictable), and that 
includes the focal player's top-ranked outcome (efficient).  This agent has no social 
preferences: given two games that are equally stable, predictable, and efficient, players are 
indifferent as to which most or least benefit others. 
The self-interested dynamic's aggregation rule is simple and consistent with a rational agent 
working to consolidate a beneficial position. The player with greater earnings after the first 
randomly selected game becomes the focal player choosing subsequent games to move to. 
Thus, power within a system confers power over it. If the first game results in tied payoffs for 
two players, the tie is broken randomly. Assuming that the player most recently in control of 
the dynamic has a small advantage, subsequent ties break in favor of the previous focal player.  
After examining its attractors in three environmental contexts for the two-player case, we 
examine the n-player case. 
Two more dynamics. Demonstrating the generality of our approach, we also compute the 
results for two other types of game agent, those that maximize relative fitness (the relative 
fitness maximizing agent of evolutionary game theory), and those that maximize group fitness 
(the relative group fitness maximizing agent of multi-level/group selection theory). We represent 
the difference by adding social preferences to the self-interested agent, in both pro- and anti-
social varieties.  Agents driving the self-interested dynamic select games based on whether the 
equilibrium outcome confers a maximum payoff to them. To define the relative fitness dynamic, 
we add an antisocial preference, defining the agent to prefer games, all else being equal, 
whose equilibrium maximizes the difference between their payoffs. In the group selection 
dynamic, the social preference is prosocial, as agents, all else being equal, select games to 
maximize the sum of payoffs conferred. 
 Although these three types of agent—behavioral, evolutionary, and group-selected—are 
very different from each other, they can be united under a single conceptual umbrella. In 
environments that have available resources or space, where competition is low, the 
evolutionary regime that establishes the basis for selective pressure will select for agents who 
choose games to maximize personal utility (or absolute payoff, as in economic game theory) so 
that they may expand at the quickest rate. In environments with few free resources and no 
group structure, agents are instead set up to choose games to maximize relative fitness (or 
relative payoffs, as in evolutionary game theory). In environments with group structure and few 
free resources, agents choose games to maximize group fitness (by minimizing relative fitness 
differences, as permitted by group/multi-level selection and other related theories).   
Measures 
We are overall interested in the attractor games of the various dynamics and how they differ 
from games in the broader space. Specifically, we are interested in how inequality properties 
change in attractors, a question that is especially interesting in the self-interested dynamic, 
which does not prefer either equality or inequality.  We offer two measures of equality. One is a 
space's proportion of "win-win" games, games in which two players share the same top-
ranked outcome. Another more sensitive and continuous measure of equality is the GINI 
coefficient of the payoffs of each game's equilibrium outcome or outcomes. 
GINI is a familiar non-parametric equality measure whose values scale between 0 (equal) 
and 1 (unequal), and that is easily generalizable to discrete payoffs. For an n player game, there 
are 2n outcomes, each with n payoffs, distributed ranging from 1 to 2n (the number of outcomes 
  
to rank). These may be nearly equal to each other or widely varied, a property that GINI can 
determine. Under this measure, an equilibrium outcome that one player ranks highly, and 
others rank poorly, will receive a high GINI score close to 1, while an outcome in which all 
players receive the same payoff (whether all high or all low) will be closer to 0, indicating high 
equality.  
 
Results 
Two-player games with absolute fitness maximizing agents 
Our motivating questions surround the nature of institutional evolution as driven by self-
interested agents. How many attractor institutions are there, how do they differ from the 
broader space, and, how do the values and features they represent differ from the values of the 
agents that selected them? 
Under the self-interested dynamic, a game is an attractor if it has a unique pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium that pays the maximum payoff to the focal player. The attractor games are a 
subset of the games with exactly one Nash equilibrium.  However, not all attractors are win-win 
and not all win-win games are attractors. For example, the game space includes a 
representation of the Stag Hunt, which is win-win by our definition but has a second 
equilibrium that sets it outside of the set of attractors.  
Contrary to intuition, "win-win" games are very numerous in the two-player space: one in 
four games drawn randomly from the two-player ordinal games are win-win (Fig. 3a).  
Moving from baseline properties of the space to properties of trajectories over it, we find 
that 37.5% (54/144) of the two-player games are attractors, and that they form a single 
contiguous basin of attractors (Fig. 3b).  Of games in this basin, 1/2 are win-win, compared to 
1/4 of all two-player games. The self-interested dynamic doubles the proportion of win-win 
games, despite the self-interested agent’s absence of social preferences. 
Two-player games with relative- and group- fitness maximizing agents 
The proportional doubling of win-win games in attractor institutions holds when agents 
maximize personal fitness, but this result is sensitive to changes in the type of agent. Given the 
results of the self-interested dynamic, it is straightforward to compute the attractors of the 
other two.  In the relative group fitness dynamic, the non-win-win games composing half of the 
attractors become unstable, and the proportion of win-win games becomes 100% (Fig. 3b).  In 
the relative individual fitness dynamic, the opposite happens, leading to a change from 25% 
win-win games over the whole space, to 0% win-win games in the attractor (Fig. 3b). 
n-player games 
Generalizing these results to n players, we gain further insight into the effects of between-
game preferences on institutional evolution.  
In general, as game population size n increases, the number of two-choice ordinal games 
quickly becomes astronomical: 
     
Although the number of 2 player games is less than 1e3, the number of 4 player games is well 
above order 1e50, and the number of 8 player games is much larger than 1e4000. Fortunately, 
these vast sums do not seem to undermine the countability of the domain. 
Attractors in the n-player games 
As the attractors of the evolutionary and group-level dynamics are a subset of those of the 
self-interested dynamic, we attend first to the properties of the self-interested agent’s 
attractors as n increases. We find, numerically, that attractors become a steadily decreasing 
proportion of games (Fig. 4a).  
This might at first glance seem to imply that dynamics become more important in steering 
evolution toward certain types of attractor games, as the vanishing number of attractors and 
  
increasing number of games contribute to an increase in the average number of steps to 
convergence. However, attendant with these effects of population growth, driven mainly by the 
increasing dimensionality of constituent games, is an explosion in the number of nearest 
neighbors per game, which in turn drives an explosion in the number of shortest paths between 
arbitrary pairs of games, and, ultimately, very unconstrained dynamics. 
Given these results for the self-interested agent, the results for the other two dynamics are 
straightforward and trivial. No new factor resulting from the increase of n pulls the relative 
fitness dynamic from 0%, or the group-level dynamic from 100%. One observation, comparing 
across the dynamics, is that the self-interested dynamic's crashing equality makes its 
institutional evolutionary outcomes more difficult to distinguish from the active selection 
against equality that we observe in the relative fitness dynamic; socially “neutral” behavior is 
effectively antisocial in large-n games. 
Scaling of inequality in the self-interested dynamic 
Focusing again on the self-interested dynamic, we look more closely at questions of 
equality.  With the explosion in the number of games with increasing n comes a crash in the 
proportion of win-win games (including "win-win-...-win" games, and so on) with size: 
     
As a fraction of the total number of games, this value decreases super-exponentially from one 
in four two-player games being win-win, to fewer than one in a billion win-win games at n=6. 
As a fraction of attractors, which themselves constitute a declining proportion of large-n 
games, win-win games decline much more quickly, such that the win-win property becomes 
vanishingly rare even among games that are selecting for them. 
However, the appeal of the win-win property as a game-level equality estimator is less about 
their suitability to the task and more about how easy they are to count. Alternative measures 
allow more sensitive judgements about the scaling of inequality in attractor institutions as the 
self-interested dynamic scales to larger populations. 
The GINI coefficient is one of these appealing alternatives. We compare the GINI coefficients 
over the payoffs of Nash outcomes of attractor and non-attractor games (Fig. 4b). The 
difference between them quickly becomes negligible, consistent with our other findings that, in 
games with a large number of players, the self-interested dynamics select for games that are 
only desirable to the single favored agent driving the dynamic. 
 
Discussion 
The interactions that structure our daily lives are not randomly selected from the space of 
social systems, nor from the small subset of systems, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and 
Stag Hunt, whose prominence derives from their ability to illustrate academic points. 
Institutions and other social structures — languages, rites, and systems of culture — develop 
through a process that can be conceptualized as a trajectory through institution space. When 
agents have preferences over games, and the ability to make incremental changes to those 
games, they can dramatically remake the space of likely institutions. In particular, we find that 
win-win outcomes change in proportion from 25% to 0%, 50%, or 100%, depending on 
whether we are considering agents that drift through the games randomly, or agents motivated 
to maximize relative personal fitness, absolute personal fitness, or relative group fitness, 
respectively.  The 50% case is especially illustrative: self-interested agents converge on a 
subset of games that are disproportionately fair in the equilibrium outcomes they provide 
because fairness tends to co-occur with the combination of predictability, stability, and 
efficiency that they seek out. This particular property seems not to scale with game size: 
incidental fairness very quickly becomes negligible as populations of self-interested agents 
  
grow. From the background of this result, the other two dynamics can be seen as 
implementing very weak "ceteris paribus" pro- or anti- social preferences. 
An alternative account of norms and conventions 
One contribution of this work is to offer an alternative account of informal institutional 
constraints like norms, conventions, and other proposed mechanisms for the real-world state 
of affairs in a society: most of our daily interactions are rote, non-strategic, and even mundane. 
Existing conceptions of norms, conventions, and other proto-institutional structures 
understand the emergence of these constructs in terms of regularities in within-game behavior: 
agents have fixed choices, some combinations of their choices are desirable but unstable, and 
agents must develop a scheme for making desirable combinations likely despite strategic 
considerations. Under a strictly within-game framework, the major questions are how the 
scheme emerges and how it persists. These questions become much more straightforward 
under a between-game conception of institutional emergence. Our simulations support a 
picture in which a norm or convention emerges as a result of institutional dynamics that drive 
agents toward entirely “non-strategic” win-win games (in which players’ interests are naturally 
aligned) or even “non-game” no-conflict games (in which their interests are orthogonal). Given 
a choice between a game that requires trust in another and one that does not, or one that 
imposes a conflict of interest and one that does not, it seems natural agents would select the 
less fraught institution.  Within our institutional evolutionary framework, the convergence of a 
population of agents upon some stable pattern of socially efficient behavior is largely a function 
of institution-scale processes, rather than strictly behavioral processes.  Agents who are 
subject to a norm or convention have not just converged on one versus another passive 
pattern of behavior, they actively perceive shifted payoffs, different consequences, and new 
strategic affordances than those who are not subject, they are in a different game and their 
collective outcome can only be modeled satisfactorily with a between-game formalism.      
The pair as the most common scale of institutional organization 
With general tools, we gain the ability to integrate observations from different disciplines and 
frameworks under a common umbrella.  One classic descriptive finding in anthropology is that 
persistent mating pairs (i.e. marriages) are an organizing principle common to many human 
societies (32). Work focused across disciplines and organizational forms has found increasingly 
large institutions to be increasingly susceptible to elite capture, unfairness and other deviations 
from win-win ideals (33, 34). While theories of the general phenomenon of capture have 
focused on active mechanisms, it may be that it falls passively out of how game spaces scale: 
that in systems with large populations, inequality provides the baseline against which more 
ideal, unlikely institutions must distinguish themselves. 
A mechanism for major transitions in human evolution 
Comparing outcomes across evolutionary, group-level, and economic agents is especially 
valuable in the case of species, such as humans. Human evolutionary history has been 
punctuated by major transitions in which qualitative shifts to new forms of organization have 
fundamentally altered societies. But explaining these shifts in evolutionary terms is difficult.  In 
one narrative, the innovations of genus Homo—tool-assisted hunting, processing of food, and 
alloparenting —created a new low-competition niche that transitioned human ancestors from 
population biology’s typical evolutionary regime of relative fitness maximization into one of 
absolute fitness maximization (35). This expansion into open niches has been shown to have 
unique dynamics, allowing for traits that otherwise would not exist (37). Then as the human 
niche filled and resource competition increased, humans transitioned into the regime that 
characterizes human cultural evolution: group-level selection operating on the basis of relative 
payoff differences. 
  
Allowing this kind of narrative, an evolutionary account of major transitions, fails to alone 
explain how the subtle differences between, for example, the maximization of relative versus 
absolute fitness could trigger major organizational changes in a society. However, it is 
precisely these subtle differences that, in our model of institutional evolution, so dramatically 
change the makeup of institutional attractors as to alternately magnify, suppress, or guarantee 
equitable social outcomes. Allowing institutional preferences to drive trajectories through game 
space provides a mechanism for major transitions, as they amplify differences between 
otherwise subtle game theoretic distinctions. 
Limitations and future work 
Our results hold for a narrow subset of games, namely those two-choice normal form games 
with ranked payoffs.  However, extensions of this space to more choices or continuous payoffs 
are not likely to change our findings.  Seen as equally-spaced partitions of continuous game 
spaces, the statistics of the ordinal games should remain proportional to those of the internal 
regions they define. And increasing the number of choices by two should only make our key 
findings stronger, particularly the decline of win-win games as population increases. More 
players means more outcomes, for example four outcomes for two players, eight outcomes for 
three players, sixteen outcomes for four players, and so forth. Thus, increasing the number of 
participants and outcomes inherently decreases the proportion of games that benefit all.  
The topology also imposes limitations that make it impossible to test other types of 
preferences that agents are likely to have, such as a preference for extensive over normal form 
games, repeated versus single-shot relationships, more versus fewer choices, or more versus 
less information about others' beliefs. 
Furthermore, our agents are ultimately artificial, and establishing the generality of our 
findings will require comparisons to real world institutional preferences. Fortunately, where 
such artificially selfish agents converge on prosocial outcomes, more realistic agents need only 
mind pro-social biases to be at least as likely to do the same. Against this promising 
background, our institutional evolutionary framework makes behavioral studies simple to 
articulate. In one design we have developed, two participants play a randomly selected game 
from the topology, and a neighboring game, and are allowed to choose which of the two to 
play a second time.  By repeating this procedure for many game pairs, an investigator can infer 
the game features that drive participants’ preferences between institutions, and directly 
compute the attractor games that those preferences drive dynamics towards. In fact, we 
explicitly developed this framework with testability in mind in order to ground the assumptions 
of this work in behavioral data and test its predictions about the defining features of attractor 
institutions. 
The flexibility of this framework makes it useful for a variety of other important problems. By 
explicitly modeling game change dynamics, we make it possible to test the effects other 
important dynamical phenomena on institutional evolution, such as history dependence, 
emergent diversity, neutral evolution, heterogeneous agents, the interaction of rules with 
culture, and the coevolution of within-game experiences and between-game preferences. For 
an example of possible extensions, consider the variety of aggregation rules. In the dynamics 
we consider here, the "winner" of a specific game outcome gains unilateral control over the 
next choice of game, a choice that may enable them to ensure that they continue to win. But in 
simple variations, the choice of game could be driven by the choice of a randomly selected 
agent, or, in a model of complex collective action, the preferences of a majority or plurality of 
players.  
 
  
Conclusion 
Agents in a mutable social environment can change their incentives as those incentives 
change them.  These institutional change processes are of fundamental interest to both 
evolutionary and behavioral game theory in general, and institutional analysis in particular.  Still, 
we have been lacking tractable frameworks for representing the richness of institutional 
evolution. Dynamics over the topology of games offer a parsimonious representation of 
institutional evolutionary processes.  Within this framework, institutional change is a trajectory 
over neighboring games in which players evolve the games they play in by incrementally 
making their payoff structures more favorable. Preferences can take into account many 
qualities, but we focus on three simple, selfish qualities: predictability of outcomes, existence 
and uniqueness of Nash stable outcomes, and efficiency of outcomes. We find that the nature 
of "institution space" can impose constraints that encourage socially beneficial outcomes even 
among agents with no interest in those outcomes, but only in small social systems. 
We advance a view that humans and other animals are not caged subjects of immutable 
institutions. Institutions evolve, often due to pressures exerted by their participants. The games 
we encounter are themselves the endpoints of dynamics that select and replicate certain 
structures over others. Elucidating the properties of "attractor" institutions sheds light on the 
emergence of organized human groups 
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FIGURES & PLOTS 
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Fig 1. A sampling of ordinal games, with a trajectory through them. 
a. The space of 2-player, 2-choice ordinal games includes a variety of interesting and 
relevant games, including well-studied games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and 
Battle of the Sexes, and less remarked upon games such as win-win games that don't require 
strategy, cyclic games without pure-strategy equilibria, and asymmetric games. Outcomes that 
are Nash equilibria are slightly brighter. By ordinal, we mean games with consecutive integer 
payoffs up to the number of outcomes. In these illustrations, 4 is high and 1 is low.  Ordinal 
games have the advantage of being amenable to counting. 
b. Two games in this space are neighbors if they differ by a swap of similar payoffs. 
Assuming that most institutional change is incremental, institutional evolution can be modeled 
as a trajectory through the neighboring games. Here we illustrate how an agent might 
incrementally evolve a prisoner's dilemma into a win-win game. This trajectory terminates on 
the game "Win-win", which is an attractor for self-interested agents who prefer stable, 
predictable, and efficient games (defined herein as offering a unique pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium that confers a maximum payoff).  Example adapted from (25). 
 
 
  
  
 
 
Fig 2 The space of two-player games, with masks illustrating some of its properties. 
a. A simple representation of the space of 144 two-player, two-choice games with ordinally 
ranked payoffs. Observe that symmetric games, occupying the increasing diagonal, are a 
minority, and that the lower-left quarter of games are win-win, in the sense of having one 
outcome that confers the maximum payoff of 4 to both players (also see Fig 3a). Spaces with 
more than two players are much larger and more difficult to diagram than this.    
b. This mask of panel a. illustrates the Nash properties of games in this space. The games in 
the blue outlines have no pure strategy Nash equilibria. The games in red outlines have two.  
The remaining games, 75%, have exactly one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We discuss how 
this distribution changes as the number of players increases. 
c. This mask of a. illustrates the complex nature of neighbor relations in the two-player 
space.  The red outlines show the six "neighbors" of the prisoner's dilemma. The blue outlines 
show the neighbors of the Battle of the Sexes. Note that some adjacent games are not visually 
adjacent, a shortcoming of the grid representation of what is in truth a much more complex 
topology. 
d. This mask of a. shows the locations of the games in Figs. 1a and 1b. 
  
  
 
Fig 3. The win-win games and the attractor games of three institutional dynamics. 
a. Win-win games account for 1/4 of the games in the two-player space, shown here in the 
lower-left quadrant. See Fig 2a for details of each, namely that each has an outcome conferring 
the maximum payoff of 4 to both players. 
b. The encompassing pink outlines shows the basin of attractors that results from self-
interested agents' evolutionary trajectories. Note that these attractor games form a contiguous 
block: as the 9 games on the right have several neighbors among the games in the block on 
the left, via swaps that are not apparent from this grid representation. Note also that half of 
these attractor games are in the win-win quadrant. Compared to panel a, the institutional 
evolutionary process double the chances of converging upon a win-win game, even though the 
selfish agents driving it have no explicit preferences for mutually beneficial games. With the 
attractors of the multilevel selection dynamic (orange outline), that probability increases to 
100%, as all of its attractor games are win-win. Conversely, the fitness maximizing evolutionary 
agent will converge on the more unfair games in the upper half (green outline), all of which have 
an asymmetry between the focal player's earnings and those of the other player. 
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Fig 4. Emergent fairness driven by the self-interested dynamic disappears as player 
populations grow.    
a. Attractors become a smaller fraction of games with increasing population. The black line, 
derived from simulation, gives the computed proportion of games up to 9 players that are 
attractors of the self-interested dynamic. b. Each game outcome contains payoffs for each 
player, and those payoffs can differ widely from each other. We compute the GINI coefficient of 
the payoffs in Nash outcomes, and compare them within the attractors and in the full space. 
We find that the difference quickly becomes negligible, telling a complementary story to that of 
Fig. 3b, that the self-interested dynamic biases institutional evolutionary processes to 
emergently select fair games when populations are small, an effect that disappears for larger 
populations. 
 
 
  
  
SUPPORTING FIGURES 
Fig S1. Richer visual representation of the topology of 2-player, 2-choice ordinal games.  
This figure, an elaboration of Fig. 2a, illustrates neighboring relations in the blue, red, and 
quadrant boundaries, and game classes by background color. Copied with permission from 
(23). 
 
 
 
 
